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RECENT DECISIONS
that application of the third party beneficiary contract theory or joint
tenancy theory is allowable under the Treasury Regulations to deter-
mine such rights; the gift theory being inapplicable. As to the inter
vivos rights of the co-owners of savings bonds, if the regulations are
construed as not conferring a property right on the co-owners but merely
a contract right, the third party beneficiary contract theory is applicable.
If they are construed as conferring property rights, then the joint ten-
ancy theory is applicable in sustaining these rights, and application of
either the gift theory or contract theory would appear to be contrary
to the Treasury Regulations.
EDWIN R. RoSSINI
Domestic Relations: Full Faith and Credit Permits Collateral
Attack of Foreign Divorce-A wife sought a divorce a mensa et
thoro in Maryland and her husband filed a motion to dismiss offering
an Alabama decree of divorce as a defense. In acknowledging the de-
fense as valid the trial court stated, ". . .the Plaintiff is estopped to now
question the jurisdiction and cannot collaterally attack the jurisdiction
issue because she appeared through local counsel in Alabama and filed
her answer and waiver .... -1 The court of appeals 2 reversed for the
following reasons: (1) neither the attorney before whom she executed
the waiver of notice and answer nor the attorney who appeared for
her in Alabama was chosen by her; (2) the waiver of notice and answer
was executed before the proceedings were filed in Alabama; and (3)
the wife did not appear in person before the court or actively partici-
pate in the proceedings.
The facts showed that the husband was absent from Maryland for
only two days and had no intention of becoming a domiciliary of Ala-
bama. Therefore, the Alabama divorce was not entitled to full faith
and credit because the court lacked jurisdiction:
A decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything
except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and
domicile is a jurisdictional fact. The State of domiciliary origin
is not bound by an unfounded recital in the record of a court of
another State .... I
A brief summary of the interpretation of the full faith and credit
clause 4 by the United States Supreme Court relative to divorce is essen-
' Brief of Appellant, Record Extract p. E4-E5, Pelle v. Pelle, 229 Md. 160, 182
A.2d 37 (1962).
2 Pelle v. Pelle, supra note 1.
3 Pelle v. Pelle, supra note 1 ,182 A.2d at 40, quoting Slansky v. State, 192 Md.
94, 108, 63 A.2d 599, 605 (1949).
4 U.S. Const. art IV, §1:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.
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tial. In the first of the Williamns 5 cases the Court held that granting the
requirements of procedural due process are fulfilled, a domiciliary is
entitled to have his marriage status altered by the state of domicile
even if the spouse affected by such decision be absent from the state.
Such a decree is not to be excepted from the full faith and credit clause
merely because its enforcement or recognition in another state would
conflict with the policy of that state.
In the second Williams6 case the Court held that North Carolina
was not barred, under the full faith and credit clause, from attacking
a decree of divorce which had been granted in a foreign jurisdiction
in an ex parte proceeding.
It is one thing to reopen an issue that has been settled after
appropriate opportunity to present their contentions has been
afforded to all who had an interest in its adjudication. This ap-
plies also to jurisdictional questions. After a contest these can-
not be relitigated as between the parties ....
Subsequent cases in this area are usually decided by determining the
meaning of the "contest" that cannot be relitigated.
In the Sherrers case the Court held that the jurisdictional question
had been adequately contested to have the full faith and credit clause
bar another state from rejudging it. In this case a husband domiciled in
Massachusetts, upon being notified of his wife's divorce action in
Florida, went to Florida, retained counsel and filed an answer denying
the allegations of the complaint, including the allegation as to the peti-
tioner's Florida residence. He was represented by counsel throughout
the entire proceeding and he even testified as a witness with respect to
a stipulation concerning custody of the children. After petitioner's in-
troduction of evidence as to her Florida residence, counsel for the
respondent failed to cross-examine or to introduce evidence in rebuttal.
The divorce was granted by the Florida court. At the instance of the
husband the Massachusetts court held the divorce void because Florida
lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that since the finding of
the requisite jurisdictional facts was made in proceedings in which the
defendant appeared and participated they were not subject to collateral
attack in another jurisdiction. The matter had been decided in a contest
and had become res judicata. The defendant's failure to contest the
matter as fully as he might have was no valid objection. Relitigation in
other states was barred by the full faith and credit clause.
Since the Sherrer case numerous recent decisions by state courts
have been handed down, thus requiring a review of the meaning of the
5 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
6 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
7Id. at 230.
8 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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Sherrer case. The Court stated: "And where a decree of divorce is ren-
dered by a competent court under the circumstances of this case the
obligation of full faith and credit requires that such litigation should
end in the courts of the State in which the judgment was rendered."
Explicitly the Court limits the decision to the facts.
The Pelle case can be distinguished from Sherrer in that the de-
fendant never took part in the Alabama proceedings, she did not choose
the attorney when she executed the waiver of notice and answer in
Washington D.C., she did not choose or have any contact with the
attorney who represented her, and the waiver was signed before the
Alabama proceedings were initiated. The Maryland court held that on
these facts a different rule of law was warranted: "But as the wife
only signed a waiver of notice and answer in the District of Columbia,
before these proceedings were filed, we do not feel that this is participa-
tion within the rule of these cases [Sherrer and Coe] .... -"0 The court
does not explain the underlying reason for distinguishing this case from
Sherrer but one might be warranted in concluding it was due to the
court's failure to find that the question of jurisdiction had been deter-
mined in a bona fide contest. In the absence of contest the reason for
denying relitigation of the jurisdictional issue is absent.
A bona fide contest supposedly results in the satisfying of the rights
of the parties by arrival at the truth. With the truth ascertained the
parties are estopped from attacking it. The distinction then between
Pelle and Sherrer should also constitute the difference between a bona
fide contest and the lack of a bona fide contest. The Pelle case would
seem to warrant the conclusion that the facts of signing the waiver
before the action is filed, not having an attorney of one's choice and
not appearing personally in the action are sufficient to destroy the es-
sence of a bona fide contest and thus make such decision vulnerable to
collateral attack. Other recent decisions have arrived at the same con-
clusion on similar facts.
In the Gherardi De Parata& case the defendant wife had signed an
acceptance of service and process and answer and waiver before the
action had been filed. The waiver stated that the husband was "a bona
fide resident of the State of Alabama." The wife also signed a letter to
an Alabama lawyer, authorizing him to file the waiver in her behalf.
The plaintiff, husband, was in Alabama for four or five hours during
which he did those things which the wife's attorney in that city told
him were necessary for the issuance of a decree. The court reasoned
that since a domicile was not established the court did not have juris-
diction, and further, the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court
9 Id. at 356.
10 Pelle v. Pelle, supra note 1, 182 A.2d at 40.
"I Gherardi De Parata v. Gherardi De Parata, 179 A.2d 723 (D.C. Munic. Ct.
App. 1962).
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by an admission of domicile. A divorce decree not based on the domi-
cile of at least one of the parties is not entitled to full faith and credit
in another jurisdiction. The court did not recognize any problem of
estoppel arising from a litigated jurisdictional question and disposed
of the case as if it were an ex parte proceeding." However, it does ques-
tion the effect of the signed waiver because of the falsehoods it con-
tained and also the subsequent proceedings because of the apparent
collusion between attorneys. Granted that the waiver was ineffectual
and the subsequent proceedings were collusive we might rationalize
the court's position by saying the case was in actuality ex parte and not
controlled by the Sherrer case, which was a contested case.
In Guerieri v. Guerieril3 the defendant, wife, had signed a waiver
of notice and answer before the filing of the proceedings. At the time
of the signing of the waiver the husband procured from her a written
appointment of Alabama counsel, who was actually retained to repre-
sent the husband. The wife did not participate in the divorce action.
After alluding to these facts the court said: "It is believed these facts
mock the elements of an adversary proceeding and fall short of the
actual participation which is required by New Jersey.1 14 Because of
the lack of a bona fide contest the court held the Alabama decree sub-
ject to collateral attack and not within the rule of the Sherrer case.
In Donnell v. Howel1 5 the court upheld a collateral attack on a
foreign divorce decree because of fraud on the court. In an action for a
partition sale of the property of a former marriage the parties stipu-
lated they never resided in Alabama, the state which granted the divorce.
Although the husband had signed a waiver the court by-passed that
fact as not being controlling. It upheld the collateral attack upon the
ground that by stating that they were never residents of Alabama the
parties admitted that they had fraudulently obtained a divorce from the
court without jurisdiction. The decree was therefore held null and void
and not entitled to full faith and credit. The court reasoned that Sherrer
allows an attack on a decree by a foreign court if the same attack could
have been made in the state granting the divorce. When the parties
admit facts showing that they defrauded the court the decree so ac-
quired is open to attack in the state which granted the decree.1 6 There-
12The court admitted that its decision was not conducive to clarifying the law;
There is confusion aplenty as to the validity of foreign divorce decrees; and
we realize that this decision may not serve to dissipate the confusion, or point
the way to complete tidiness and symmetry in this field of law. But we are
satisfied that it is dictated by the circumstances of this case.
Id. at 726-727.
13 Guerieri v. Guerieri, 75 N.J. Super. 541, 183 A.2d 499 (1962).
14 Id., 183 A.2d at 504.
15 Donnell v. Howell, 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
16 Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So.2d 725 (1961) ; Even though a
judgment is valid on its face, if the parties admit facts which show that it is
void, or if such facts are established without objection, the case is similar to
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fore a decree becomes vulnerable in a foreign court when facts are
admitted which show that the court which issued the decree was de-
frauded in granting it.
In light of these recent decisions what conclusion can be safely
drawn as to the present meaning of the Sherrer rule? The principle that
a foreign divorce decree is vulnerable to collateral attack if granted in
an ex parte proceeding and not vulnerable to collateral attack if ob-
tained under the factual circumstances of Sherrer is clear. The gray
area between these two types of proceedings is still in need of analysis.
If, as we have suggested, a bona fide contest is the prerequisite to col-
lateral invulnerability the essence of bona fide contest must be explored
in an attempt to determine its elements.
The Pelle case suggests three elements to a contest. Are all three
necessary for a contest? If competent counsel who is familiar with all
the factors is selected to handle the case would the court hold that per-
sonal appearance and participation are necessary to prevent collateral
attack? Since the defendant through his counsel has full opportunity to
defend his rights, personal absence from the action should not create
the right of collateral attack.
Presence through counsel not of one's own choosing has been cited
by several recent decisions'1 as indicative of absence of bona fide con-
test. The courts do not comment on its necessity. To universally demand
personal choice of attorney as a prerequisite to a bona fide contest would
seem to be too rigorous a rule. However, post factum, failure to be
represented by counsel of one's choice apparently carries much weight
in convincing the court that in fact the decree was entered in a proceed-
ing which was not a bona fide contest.
The signing of a waiver of notice and answer before the proceeding
is brought has been referred to in several of the cases' as a reason for
allowing collateral attack. The courts have not elaborated on whether
such a previous signing vitiates a bona fide contest. But doesn't tem-
poral disparity destroy the idea of contest? Should the courts view a
previously acquired and preserved retaliation as a sufficient and true
element of a bona fide contest? A "previously-waived-case" would seem
to be ineffectual to the establishment of such truth as gives rise to
estoppel to its attack. None of the cases we have referred to have in-
volved signing of the waiver after the proceedings have been filed. It
would seem that the courts in such a case would be warranted in decid-
one wherein the judgment is void on its face and is subject to collateral
attack. 49 C.J.S. Judgments §421, p. 824 (1947).
17Pelle v. Pelle, supra note 1, 182 A.2d at 39; Gherardi De Parata v. Gherardi
De Parata, supra note 11, at 726; Guerieri v. Guerieri, supra note 13, 183
A2d at 504.28 Pelle v. Pelle, supra note 1, 182 A2d at 39; Gherardi De Parata v. Gherardi
De Parata, supra note 11, at 726; Guerieri v. Guerieri, supra note 13, 183
A.2d at 504.
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ing that this is surrender by a contestant in a bona fide contest giving
rise to the estoppel.
States, in their concern to control the marital status of their resi-
dents, are defining areas in which foreign divorce decrees are subject
to collateral attack. Although admission of fraud on the court is effectual
when the facts proving it are present, the main area of collateral attack
will continue to be failure of the foreign court to determine the juris-
dictional question in a bona fide contest. Among the chief reasons for
finding a lack of bona fide contest will be the fact that the defendant
did not have counsel of his own choosing and the fact that waiver of
notice and answer was signed before the filing of the proceedings. Per-
sonal appearance as such does not seem to be of controlling importance
except in so far as when it is present it will serve as strong evidentiary
proof that a bona fide contest was had. In final analysis whether a bona
fide contest was had will have to be determined on a case to case basis.
ROBERT H. BICHLER
Conveyancing: Interpretation of "Subject to Financing" Clauses
in Interim Contracts for Sale of Realty-Walter E. Pire and his
wife Emily signed an offer to purchase the property of the Gerruth
Realty Co. for $30,000. Pire tendered a $5,000 down payment in the
form of a promissory note, payable at the time of closing. The offer
was conditioned upon Pire's buying the adjacent property for $40,000,
the closing of the purchase of the two properties being scheduled to
occur simultaneously. Although the Pires "thought they would have no
difficulty in arranging financing," they insisted that this clause be in-
serted:
This offer to purchase is further contingent upon the purchaser
obtaining the proper amount of financing.'
Though no formal application was made, Pire was refused a $75,000
first mortgage loan against the two properties from the Second National
Bank of Beloit, due to the bank's policy of not loaning any individual
over $100,000 or more than 66% per cent of the value of the security.'
Gerruth and the owner of the adjacent property, Putterman, then of-
fered to finance Pire to the extent of $45,000. This proposal was re-
fused as being inadequate.
The trial court held the "subject to financing" clause to be a con-
dition precedent; found that Pire attempted in good faith to fulfill it;
and dismissed a suit on the earnest money note. In affirming, the
Supreme Court held the whole contract void for indefiniteness, and
1 Gerruth Realty Co. v. Pire 17 Wis. 2d 89, 115 N.W. 2d 557 (1962).
2 Presumably, Pike had previously borrowed at least $25,000.
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